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Regulating the Professional Sports
Agent: Is California in the
Right Ballpark?
An agent has been defined as "one who acts for or in the place
of another by authority from him" or "a business representative whose
function is to bring about, modify, effect . . . contractual obliga-

tions between the principal and third persons."' Under these definitions, the principal can be a professional athlete and the third person

can be a professional sports team. The distinguishing characteristic
of a sports agent is that he represents the athlete in seeking employ-

ment, and when properly authorized, negotiates contracts for the
athlete that the athlete is bound to perform. 2 Commonly, the athlete
agent will agree to provide services in three areas: contract negotiation, investment advice, and promotional services. 3
Today, two types of agents may be found in professional sports:

agents who are attorneys, and agents who lack significant legal
training." Several professional athletes have been very successful in
either negotiating their own contracts5 or in obtaining advice from
an agent who is not an attorney. 6 Commentators have suggested,
however, that not only are nonattorney agents likely to be less
scrupulous in their methods of operation than attorney agents, 7 but
that the athlete is likely to receive better representation from attorney
agents. 8
1. S. GALuNiR, PRO SPORTS: THE CONTRACT GAm 51 (1974).
2. Id.
3. The representation agreement may require the representative to: (1) negotiate the athlete's
employment contract or contracts as a professional athlete; (2) give financial and investment
counseling, i.e., invest in stocks, bonds, real estate, restaurants, etc., and devise a prudent
investment plan; (3) give advice on tax savings; (4) plan for future security; (5) publicize and
promote the athlete's name and abilities to benefit his reputation and possible draft position;
(6) conduct endorsements and advertising. Id. at 66.
4. Id. at 50.
5. Id. at 51.
6. One author writes:
As an example that no special skill is required to act as an agent, look at [baseball
player] Randy Hundley . . . who used his father, a builder, as his representative;
or [football player] Duane Thomas . . . who used former football player Abner Hayes.
Others who have become agents include a drycleaning manager, a building contractor, a college athletic trainer, a stockbroker, and an accountant.
Id.
7. See id. at 64; see also Burrows v. Piobus Management, 31 Civ. No. 16840 (N.D.
Ga., Aug 9, 1973) (unpublished order).
8. See GALNraR, supra note 1, at 64.
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Almost any person capable of acting as an agent for himself may
act as an agent for another9 because of the nature of the principalagent relationship.' 0 Agents exhibit vastly different levels of expertise
and knowledge about the contract negotiating system in professional
sports." Some critics have stated that the athlete is in a position to
be taken advantage of if he does not approach contract negotiations
with an intelligent and scrupulous agent.12 The greatest complaint from
athletes is that the services promised to the athlete by the agent either
are not delivered or are drastically inadequate. 3 Conversely, several
situations have arisen in which the agent has complained of being
dismissed improperly, thus entitling him to the compensation due him
as dictated by the agreement between the agent and the athlete. 4
Recently, several methods for regulating athlete agents have been
developed. These methods have been designed to eliminate the potential problems that exist in the field of athlete representation. 5 In 1981,
the California Legislature added a new chapter to the California Labor
Code to reduce the potential for abuse in the field of representing
professional athletes by both attorney and nonattorney agents.' 7 Selfregulation by agents also has been attempted with limited success.' 8
Sports associations, moreover, have established regulations with which
agents must comply to represent athletes participating in a particular
sport or league.' 9 Finally, courts reluctantly have attempted to lend
some order to the field of athlete representation through application
of standard contract and agency principles. 0
The methods of regulation currently in existence are ineffective.
They have not provided an enforceable method of resolving the prob9. Id at 51.
10.
11.
12.

R. ROxiN, AN AmHLrET's GUIDE TO AGENTs 21 (1983).
Id. at 22-23.
See GALLNER, supra note 1, at 51.

13.

See Note, Agents of ProfessionalAthletes, 15 NEw ENG. L. REv., 545, 547-48 (1980).

14.

Zinn v. Parish, 461 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. I11. 1977).

15.

See infra notes 92, 123, 150 and accompanying text.

16. CAL. LAB. CODE §§1500-1547.
17. Press Release from California State Assemblyman Bill Lockyer, February 9, 1981 (copy
on file at the Pacific Law Journal).

There are . . . a great number of kids who are more or less blind when they enter
this business, who may not know what constitutes a good contract or a maximum
benefit. This bill (AB 440) is especially for them. It is for the rookies and for all
those hundreds of players who may not ... have the upper hand in contract negotiations, but who constitute the real work force in professional sports.
Id.

18. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
20. See Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp. 717, 724 (S.D. Cal.
1960); Comment, The Agent-Athlete Relationship in ProfessionalSports: The Inherent Potential for Abuse and the Need for Regulation, 30 BUFFALO L. REv. 815, 817 n.12 (1981).
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lems created by athlete agents. Many of the problems that existed
prior to the introduction of these methods remain unsolved.
The purpose of this comment is to explain the problems that exist
in the athlete-agent relationship. This comment will demonstrate the
difficulties encountered in the area of athlete representation by nonattorney agents. The problems created by nonattorney representation
will be contrasted with the benefits that exist when the athlete is
represented by an attorney agent. In addition, this comment will examine the methods currently used to regulate athlete agents, focusing
upon the reasons these methods are ineffective. Finally, the author
will present proposals for improving athlete agent regulation by remedying any existing methods that can become, with certain changes, enforceable systems of regulation in the field of athlete representation.
An examination of recent cases will demonstrate the types of problems that currently exist in the field of athlete representation.
ILLUSTRATING THE BASIS FOR DISPUTE

With the rise of professional sports as a viable part of the entertainment industry, and with the creation of new rival leagues competing for talented athletes," the relationship between athletes and
their agents has become almost as important as the relationship between athletes and the teams that employ them.2 2 An agent's service
to an athlete can ensure not only that the athlete receives the best
contract available, but that the athlete's maximum promotional value
is used to the economic benefit of the athlete. 23 The agent also serves
a useful purpose in bridging the gap between collective bargaining
agreements obtained by player associations that establish rights for
all players in a certain sport and the individual needs of a particular
athlete not covered in the collective bargaining agreements.2" Collective bargaining agreements exist between the players unions and the
owners of the teams in each respective sport. 25 They provide certain
benefits for every athlete entering into a professional contract and
establish standard terms and obligations that must be included in all
21. See GAUNeR, supra note 1, at 53-54. In 1983 for example, the United States Football
Lea.ue began competition. Already the USFL has been able to lure away several players from
the National Football League. SPORTING NEws, Feb. 28, 1983, at 48.
22. See GALLNER, supra note 1, at 50. "The importance of choosing a skilled, reliable
and ethical representative cannot be overremphasised." Id. For an explanation of the benefits
an athlete can derive from being represented by an agent, see RuxIN, supra note 10, at 17-21.
23. See GALLNER, supra note 1, at 50.
24. See RuxiN, supra note 10, at 101. Collective bargaining agreements are also called
basic agreements. Id.
25. Id.
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sports contracts.2 6 The agent can aid the athlete in obtaining rights
and compensation which exceed the minimum requirements called for
in the collective bargaining agreements. The skilled agent also
understands peripheral areas involving tax benefits, corporate gains
advantages, mutual funds, and long term investments." Writers have
commented that the athlete should be able to pursue his goal of achieving career success, leaving his financial security to one who understands
the complex business transactions involved in modern professional
sports.28
As a result of the increased interest in professional sports and
necessary use of sports agents, a dramatic increase in the number of
cases in which one party has taken advantage of the other has been
reported.2 9 Although some complaints are brought by the professional
sports team,3" many are initiated by the athlete. 3 ' Numerous complaints arise when one agent attempts to convince an athlete that he
can provide better representation for the athlete than the athlete's
current agent.3 2 Often, dealings of agents are detrimental not only
to athletes, but to other agents as well. This problem is exemplified
in Roundball Enterprises Inc. v. Ray Richardson and G. Patrick
1
Healy.33
Roundball v. Richardson and Healy

A.

Young, often uneducated athletes are highly impressionable and
sometimes are considered to be "untutored and unwise." ' 34 An athlete
can encounter serious legal problems with little difficulty by failing
to understand the ramifications of his decisions. The defendant in
the Roundball case, Michael Ray Richardson, is a professional basketball player who had agreed with Roundball Enterprises to be represented in contractual negotiations exclusively by Roundball." Roundball
also was to provide Richardson with financial and business advise26. One author explains: "In addition to knowing what other comparable players are being paid, a good agent offers attributes which most players lack: detailed knowledge of the
rights of his client under his contract and his basic agreement . . . " Id. at 19.

27.

GALLNER,

supra note 1, at 64,

28. Id. at 64.
29. Comment, supra note 20, at 816.
30. See, e.g., Cincinatti Bengals Inc. v. Bergey, 453 F. Supp. 129, 131 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
31. See, e.g., Burrows v. Probus Management, 31 Civ. No. 16840 (N.D. Ga., Aug 9,
1973) (unpublished order) (football player suing agent); Brown v. Woolf, 554 F. Supp. 1206,
1207 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (hockey player suing agent).
32. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
33. No. 82 Civ. No. 7000 (S.D. N.Y. March 31, 1983).
34. Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Cannon, 185 F. Supp. 717, 726 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
35. Roundball, No. 82 Civ. No. 7000 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
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ment services. 36 In addition, Roundball acquired a power of attorney 37

from Richardson regarding a cash management account maintained
in Richardson's name by a large investment house.3 8

Richardson subsequently met Healy who was president of Professional Sports Management, a corporation offering the same services
as Roundball Enterprises. 39 Richardson was persuaded to sign an agree-

ment retaining Professional Sports Management as Richardson's exclusive business representative and notified Roundball that the prior

contract was terminated.40 A few months later, Richardson allegedly
contracted again with Roundball, employing it as his exclusive business

and financial manager.," Then, apparently at Healy's suggestion,
Richardson revoked the power of attorney given to Roundball.

2

Roundball brought suit against Healy and Richardson for wrongful
interference with its contractual relationship and for breach of
contract. 3
Proper counseling from a qualified attorney would help prevent
athletes such as Michael Ray Richardson from ending up in court."
The attorney's familiarity with the law, combined with certain ethical
considerations, constrains an attorney's conduct so the possibility of
an attorney counseling an athlete to disregard a prior contract is
substantially reduced.4 5 The activities of nonattorney agents rarely are
regulated. 46 As a result, many persons who should not be athlete agents
36. Id.
37. One author explains:
A power of attorney is a written document by which one person (the athlete) appoints another person (who may not necessarily be an attorney) as his legal representative or agent and gives that agent authority to perform certain acts or kinds of
acts on the athletes behalf, such as signing contracts and incurring debts.
RuxYN, supra note 10, at 47. Professional basketball players World Free and Johnny Neuman
found out the hard way that an athlete should not give his agent a power of attorney to handle
all investments. Id.
38. Roundball, No. 82 Civ. No. 7000 (S.D. N.Y. March 31, 1983).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See GA1LNER, supra note 1, at 64.
45. Id. at 69-71; see infra note 163 and accompanying text. One writer has made an insightful comment about using an attorney as an agent:
Because an attorney seeks to establish a long-term business relationship with the athlete,
the contract negotiations serve primarily as a stepping stone to generate other business
for the attorney. It is therefore more likely that an attorney will seek to maximize
every aspect of the contract terms for his client without taking financial advantage
of him. He knows the association will continue to provide legal fees as long as he
continues to represent him.
GALLNER, supra note 1, at 67-68.
46. The only state that currently regulates agents is California. RuxiN, supra note 10, at 91.
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are allowed to represent athletes and manage their finances without
having proven expertise. Furthermore, since no regulation exists for
nonattorney agents, athletes lack the ability to be informed of the
qualifications of possible agents. This lack of information can have
grave consequences for the athlete.
47
B. Information of Richard Sorkin

A less complicated case, but one with far reaching consequences,
involved a nonattorney operating out of New York. Richard Sorkin
became involved in athlete representation when his brother-in-law purchased the New York franchise in the then newly established World
Hockey Association (WHA). 8 Prior to his involvement with his
brother-in-law's franchise, Sorkin had been a sports writer.49 He had
no legal training and had never negotiated a contract for an athlete.50
As a talent scout for the franchise, Sorkin discovered several hockey
players playing in the minor leagues who eventually became members
of the older, established National Hockey League (NHL).'
Sorkin started his sports agent career by negotiating contracts with
teams in both the WHA and NHL, promising to advise and counsel
clients on finances and investments, and to review their taxes. 2 Players
for whom Sorkin had negotiated contracts began to rely on Sorkin
for all their financial and business needs." As a player would turn
over his paycheck to Sorkin for investment and savings purposes,
Sorkin would advise each client of the balance of his account."4 Actually, Sorkin was pooling these funds from his clients and using most
of the money to satisfy his gambling habit which he had prior to
becoming an athlete agent." When checks began to bounce, the clients
became suspicious and discovered that the stated balances in their
47. People v. Sorkin, No. 46429 (Nassau County, N.Y. Ct. Nov. 28, 1977), aff'd, 407
N.Y.S. 2d 772 (App. Div. 2d Dept., July 24, 1978).

48. Montgomery, The Spectacular Rise and Ignoble Fall of Richard Sorkin, Pros Agent,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1977, §5, at 1, col. 1.
49. Id. at 15, col. 1.
50.
51.

Id.
Among these were such players as Bob Nystrom, Lorne Henning, Lanny McDonald,

and Tom Lysiak. Id. at 15, col. 3.
52.
53.

Id.
"Sorkin claimed to provide complete financial services for his players. All paychecks

were sent directly to him, and, after deducting his fees, usually at the beginning of a contract,
Sorkin was to pay all the bills and keep the money in a trust at interest of six percent." Id.
at 15, col. 4.
54. Id.

55. "He was considered [to be] a gambler, but not an extravagant one. Authorities put
the range of his bets [in 1969] at $50 or $100 a week-perhaps a third of his salary. Id. at
15, col. 1.
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accounts were fictitious and that most of the money had been spent
by Sorkin.6
More than fifty professional hockey and basketball players were
the victims. Investigating authorities placed the losses of Sorkin's clients
at approximately $1.2 million; $626,000 was traced to gambling losses
while $271,000 was due to stock market losses.17 Sorkin eventually
pled guilty to seven counts of grand larceny." The athletes, however,
recovered very little of their lost money.
The Sorkin case is notable because Sorkin had been dismissed from
a previous job for gambling and for attempting to bribe a race horse
jockey." If a proper background investigation had been conducted
or required before Sorkin was allowed to represent athletes, he may
have been denied permission to undertake athlete agent activities, and
many of the problems would not have occurred. 6 ° The Sorkin case
evidences the need for athlete agent regulations that require a proper
background investigation to be completed before the agent receives
a license to engage in athlete representation.' Comprehensive regulation would prevent a person such as Richard Sorkin, who has a propensity for misusing funds, from becoming an agent. Other abuses
occur in the form of fraud perpetrated against the athlete due to a
lack of established regulations that control the agent in his dealings
with the athlete. It is essential for the protection of the athlete that
some type of fee schedule be included in the regulatory scheme
imposed.
C. Brown v. Woolf 62

Athletes who have been disappointed by the services rendered to
them by their agents have sued their agents on theories of misrepresentation, undue influence, and fraud. An example of a case in which
56. Id. at 15, col. 4.
57. Id. at 15, col. 6.
58. See Sorkin, No. 46429 (Nassau County, N.Y. Ct. Nov. 28, 1977), aff'd, 407 N.Y.S.
2d 772 (App. Div. 2d Dept., July 24, 1978).
59. Montgomery, supra note 48, at 15, col. 1.
60. One person involved in the case is quoted as saying: -[M]anagement and players'
associations have a stake in getting together and appointing people whose sole job
is to watch agents. . . . You can't count on prosecutors to keep organized crime
out of sports or players from losing their money. Prosecutors, by their nature, come
in after the fact."
Id. at 15, col. 6.
61. Prosecuting Attorney Dennis Dillon of the Nassau County District Attorney's Office
was quoted as saying: "Obviously, the case calls out for some method of scrutinizing the
background of people who want to become agents. . . . If somebody is a compulsive gambler,
he would be sorely tempted to give information or influence games." Id. at 15, col. 1.
62. 554 F. Supp. 1206 (1983).
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a court has found fraud to have been perpetrated is Brown v. Woolf.63
Andrew Brown, a professional hockey player, had engaged the services of Robert Woolf, a well-known sports agent and attorney, to
negotiate a contract for Brown with the Pittsburgh franchise of the
NHL. 6 The team offered to pay Brown $80,000 per year under a
two year contract. 65 Woolf rejected the offer, telling Brown that the
athlete could receive a guaranteed contract for a longer period of time
with better benefits from a team in the WHA 6 After Brown signed
a five year contract with a WHA team, the team began having financial difficulties.67 Woolf then negotiated two reductions in compensation in Brown's contract that included the loss of a retirement fund."
At the same time, Woolf attempted to collect his fee from Brown,
based on a percentage of the full value of the contract prior to any
reductions. 69 Eventually, the team declared bankruptcy. Brown received
a total of $185,000 on an $800,000 contract, while Woolf received
his full five percent fee of $40,000.0
Brown brought suit against Woolf based on constructive fraud. 7'
Brown claimed that Woolf had made several material misrepresentations upon which he had relied during the modification negotiations."
Brown also claimed that Woolf violated his fiduciary duty by failing
to investigate the financial situation of the franchise, and by failing
to examine possible consequences of a deferred compensation agreement. Brown alleged a further breach of Woolf's fiduciary duty in
that Woolf had negotiated reductions in his client's compensation while
insisting on receiving his full fee.7 3 Absent regulations that would prevent an agent from receiving his fee even when his client does not
receive the compensation negotiated under the contract with the sports
team, the problems presented in the Brown situation will continue

63. Id.
64. Id. at 1207.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Brown therefore, only received approximately 24% of the amount he was entitled
to pursuant to his contract with his employer. Woolf, on the other hand received a fee of

over 21% based on what Brown received, a dramatic increase over the 50% called for in the
representation agreement. Id.
71. Id. at 1208. The case defined constructive fraud as "acts or a course of conduct from
which an unconceivable advantage is or may be derived, a breach of confidence coupled with
an unjust enrichment which shocks the conscience or a breach of duty . . .which [the] law
declares fraudulent because of a tendency to deceive.
Id.
72. Id. at 1207.
73. Id.
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to occur.74 The amount of fees charged by an agent continues to be
an area in the field of athlete representation where athletes are most
vulnerable.
The Agent's Fee

D.

One of the problem areas that is least regulated, and which usually
arises after a contract is negotiated, is the amount of fees charged
by the agent. 75 Most fees are calculated in one of three ways: on.
a contingency or percentage basis, on an hourly basis, or on a flat
fee basis.76 The most criticized, yet most popular method, is the
percentage basis." While most agents regularly charge between six
and ten percent of the athletes' total earnings,"7 some agents have
been successful in charging up to twenty-five percent of the value
of the contract negotiated by the agent. 9
Fees are usually established by payment structures that also present a problem. For example, agents often will negotiate a contract
so that a large lump sum is paid up front to the athlete, enabling
the agent to receive his fee regardless of whether the athlete remains
employed or the team remains financially solvent."0 Some commentators contend that if the agent is hired to seek employment for the
athlete and employment is obtained, the agent is entitled to his fee
regardless of what happens between the athlete and his employer in

74. For a discussion of the ability of agents to take their fee up front without regard
to what happens in the future between the athlete and the athlete's employer, see GALLNER,
supra note 1, at 52, 67.
75. Robert Ruxin gives a warning to the athlete:
The athlete should discuss in detail an agent's method of fee calculation before agreeing
to retain the agent. More than one player has discovered later that what he assumed
to be free was not. After [football player] Greg Pruitt signed his first pro football
contract, his agent reportedly gave him a list of every expense he had incurred while
Pruitt was an undergraduate. The agent had insisted that if Pruitt needed anything,
he should let him know, and Pruitt did.
RuXIN, supra note 10, at 57.
76. Id. at 55.
77. For a discussion of the benefits and criticisms of the percentage basis method, see
id.at 55-56.
78. Comment, supra note 20, at 822.

79.

GALLNER,

supra note 1, at 52.

The most respected athletic representatives find the payment of large percentages
unethical. The representative who negotiated contracts for pro basketball stars Kareem
[-Abdul] Jabbar and Sidney Wicks of the NBA has said "I dislike super-agents. They
prey on unsuspecting black athletes with ghetto backgrounds. Agents like that ought
to be paid an hourly fee, not a percentage . . . No one is worth 10 percent of a
player's earnings."

Id.
80.

Comment, supra note 20, at 821.
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the future." In most situations, however, the agent is not hired solely
to obtain employment, but also to provide a complete financial
management package to be furnished for the life of the agreement
between the athlete and his agent.82 When the agent receives his fee
after finding employment for the athlete, but prior to delivering the
required services, the agent is in a position to abuse his fiduciary
and contractual obligations to the athlete. 3 Regulations that would
impose a fee and payment schedule on agents would minimize, if not
solve, these problems and would prevent the unsuspecting athlete from4
being bound to pay an agent for services that are never rendered.1
In summary, choosing a reliable, knowledgeable and ethical agent
is of utmost significance to an athlete negotiating a contract with a
professional sports team.85 A knowledgeable agent not only understands
the complex bargaining process," 6 but also can estimate the employment and promotional values of the athlete.87 Moreover, a proficient
agent can evaluate the athlete's best economic alternatives during the
contract negotiation process.88 The problems noted above demonstrate
that many of the difficulties that arise in the sports agency field are
attributable to a lack of effective regulation. Several attempts have
been made to regulate the field of athlete agents to prevent those
problems from recurring. 9 Although a few of the regulations have
had limited success, most have been unsuccessful.
PRESENT METHODS OF REGULATION

The athlete-agent relationship is regulated in varying degrees depending on the state and the sport in which the athlete participates. Califor-

81. For an argument that theatrical agents, who are similar in many respects to athlete
agents, should receive their fee upon employment of the actor, see Johnson and Lang, The
PersonalManager in the CaliforniaEntertainment Industry, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 375, 406-07

(1974).
82.

RuxiN, supra note 10, at 17-21.

83. According to one writer:
Up-front collection cheats a player in two ways. First, as the NFL rookie [may]
discover, he may be cut and not receive part or all of [his] salary. Second, due to

inflation, a dollar today buys more than today's dollar will by next year and much
more than today's dollar will buy in twenty years when the player may be collecting

deferred compensation. But an agent who collects up front receives his entire fee
in present dollars rather than in the inflated dollars the player will earn.
Id. at 58.
84. See infra note 114
85. See supra note 22
86. Ruxin, supra note
87. See supra note 23

88.
89.
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nia is the only state that has attempted regulation through legislation. 90
Internal regulation by both players' associations and agent organizations are existing alternatives to legislative mandate. An examination
of these and other methods will show why none presents an enforceable
scheme of effective regulation.
The California Labor Code

A.

Players, agents, and management, at various times, have expressed
their desires to have athlete agents regulated or licensed. 91 The California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 440 in 198192 adding a new chapter
to the California Labor Code purporting to regulate the athlete
representation field. 93 The new chapter is unique in its approach toward
regulating athlete agents.9 ' Several areas, nevertheless, continue to cause
problems in light of the new law. Three of the more controversial
subjects are the charging of fees, the effectiveness of bonding requirements, and the difficulty of deciding who is covered by the laws.
1.

Problems in defining who is covered

Section 1500 of the Labor Code defines an athlete agent as one
who "recruits or solicits any person to enter into any agency contract or professional sports service contract or for a fee procures
... or attempts to obtain employment for any person with a professional sports team." 9 5 Problems enforcing the California regulations
have arisen because of a provision9 6 excepting attorneys from the
regulation when acting as legal counsel. An attorney acting in the
role of a sports agent is covered by the provisions of the law, but
an attorney is not covered when representing the athlete as legal
counsel.9 7 Critics have claimed that the phrase "as legal counsel" is
too broad and can cover almost any activity in which an attorney
engages, including acting as a representative of a professional athlete. 98
Many contend that when the agent is negotiating for the athlete, he
90. CAL. LAB. CODE §§1500-1547.
91. See generally Licensing of Sports Agents: Interim Hearings on AB 440 Before the California State Senate Select Committee on Licenses and Designated Sports July 22, 1983. [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
92.

CAL. LAB. CODE §§1500-1547.

93. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
94. In 1981 the State of New York considered similar legislation, but failed to implement
any method of agent regulation. See Comment, supra note 20, at 836-37.
95. CAL. LAB. CODE §1500(b).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Hearings, supra note 91, at 19 (statement of Attorney Margaret A. Leonard).

1241

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15

actually is engaging in the practice of law.99 Ascertaining when an
attorney agent is subject to regulation pursuant to the California Labor
Code, therefore, is virtually impossible.
Section 1510 of the Labor Code requires agents who are covered
by the law to register with the Labor Commissioner prior to conducting any business activities.' 0 Section 1511 requires an agent to submit a registration application with the Labor Commissioner.' 0' The
purpose of this application is to provide the Labor Commissioner with
information from which a background investigation can be conducted.
The basis for exempting attorneys from the registration requirements
is the existence of the American Bar Association Code of Professional
Responsibility. The code arguably provides sufficient preexisting
guidelines for the attorneys' conduct.' 2 The exemption for attorneys,
however, does little to aid enforcement of the provision. When the
laws went into effect, 150 athlete agents were notified; only eighteen
applications were filed requesting licenses with fourteen applications
resulting in licenses being issued.0 3 Violations of the law have resulted
in only one criminal complaint.'10 The primary reason so few agents
have registered is because of the ambiguous wording of the exemption provided for attorneys under section 1500.105 Enforcement of the
new chapter of the Labor Code would be improved if the Labor Code
99.

Sports Attorney Jeffrey Jacobs has said: "When an agent is sitting in there negotiating

a contract, I think he's practicing law to a certain extent." McLeese, A Whole New Ball Game
For Lawyers, 9 STUDENT LAWYER.41, 46 (1980-81).
100. CAL. LAB. CODE §1510.
101. Id. §1511.

102.

See Hearings, supra note 91, at 16 (Statement of Attorney Margaret A. Leonard).

I feel that the State Bar Association does a fantastic job. And the incentive for me
to be a good attorney, and to be ethical and to take care of my clients is the threat

of disbarment. I think that disbarment is a fantastic encouragement for me to operate
professionally.

Id.
The A.B.A. has undertaken to state rules of professional ethics that it hopes will
be adopted by the states through their own bar associations or courts. By this pro-

cess of adoption, and perhaps simply through recognition of the rules within the
profession at large, the bar seeks to establish prevailing norms governing the responsibilities of the attorney in the attorney-client relationship ....
The rules promulgated
by the bar association therefore have considerable significance ...
Hazard, An HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALim. L. Rnv. 1061,

1065 (1978).
103. See Hearings, supra note 91, at 28-29 (statement of Carol Cole, Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement).
104. Id. at 29.
105.

Id. at 40 (statement of Carol Cole, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement).

[T]he most prevalent issue . . . is the issue of licensing of attorneys. The law
* . . is not clear when acting as legal counsel [sic]. . . . We attempted to [regulate
attorneys] by indicating that if more than 50% of the attorney's time was in matters
related to other than sports service contracts that he would be exempt. . . . But
the problem ... in enforcement is that we don't have any way of following through
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were to cover all types of agents, including attorneys and nonattorneys
alike. Outside of the definition of attorney agent and the exception
for attorneys, the Labor Code bonding requirement has attracted the
most attention.
2.

Bonding Requirements

Section 1519 requires an agent to deposit a $10,000 surety bond
with the Labor Commissioner prior to being issued a license to represent athletes.' 6 A surety bond is designed to protect the insured from
liability for damages or to protect the persons damaged by injuries
occasioned by the assured as specified in the bond.0 7 The bond provides a source of relief for the athlete if he suffers any damages due
to an agent's misrepresentation, fraud, or deceit.' 8
To comprehend the inadequacy of this provision an understanding
of the way in which a bond is secured and the current salary market
of professional athletes is required. In most situations, a bond is
secured through a bonding company, with the person seeking the bond
paying approximately ten percent of the face value of the bond. 109
The bonding company then issues the bond, and provides, for a fee,
the remaining ninety percent of the value of the bond." 0 An agent
who wishes to comply with section 1519, therefore, must pay only
ten percent of $10,000 or $1000 to receive a license to practice as
a professional sports agent.
In light of the relatively small amount of money an agent must
procure to be bonded, an examination of average salary levels in some
of the major professional sports is important. The average annual
salary in professional basketball is $215,000,1'1 while the average in
professional football, which has one of the lowest average salary levels
in professional sports, is $90,102.112 If an athlete were to sign a contract at the average salary level in professional basketball, he could
with that as to [the extent of non-sports service work]. And according to [my information], about 85% of the agents are attorneys.

Id.
106. CAL. LAB. CODE §1519.
107. BLACKS LAW DICTONARY 225 (4th ed. 1968) (definition of surety bond).
108. CAL. LAB. CODE §1520 states in part: "Such surety bonds . . . shall be conditioned
that the [applicant] . . . will pay all sums due any individual or group of individuals when
such person or his . . . agent has received such sums, and will pay all damages occasioned
by reason of misstatement, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit . . . "
109. Telephone interview with Garry D. Stewart, Attorney, (Nov. 23, 1983) (notes on file
at the Pacific Law Journa).
110. Id.
111. RuxN, supra note 10, at 112.
112. Id.
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receive only a fraction of his salary in the form of damages provided
for by the bond.
The bonding requirement is inadequate because it fails to take into
consideration the value of the average professional sports contract.
The bond does not provide an adequate remedy to the athlete who
is economically injured by the misfeasance of an agent." 3 The new
chapter of the Labor Code also was designed to remedy the problems
4
arising from the charging of fees by agents."
3. Fees
Section 1531 requires an agent to submit a fee schedule to the Labor
Commissioner. " ' A fee schedule establishes the percentage of the
client's contract an agent will charge his client and states how the
agent is to be paid." 6 Although this provision would allow the athlete
to determine the percentage of the contract that the agent will take
prior to entering into any representation agreement, the provision fails
to establish a maximum percentage figure that the agent may charge." 7
As evidenced by the Woolf case," 8 situations may exist where the
agent ends up receiving a fee that is substantially higher than that
which the athlete and the agent agreed the agent would receive. A
percentage limitation should be imposed to prevent an agent from
taking advantage of an unsuspecting athlete by receiving more than
that to which he is entitled. For example, although the stated contract fee for Robert Woolf in Brown v. Woolf'19 was five percent,
Woolf ultimately received over twenty-one percent of the compensation received by the athlete, because the athlete only received approx20
imately one-fourth of his contract salary from his employer.
While California has attempted to regulate sports agents, no other
state has followed its lead.' 2' Consequently, many sports industries
have established regulations to control agents operating in particular
sports. This type of internal regulation may provide California with
an alternative to its present laws.
13. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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CAL. LAB. CODE §1531.
infra note 128 and accompanying text.
CAL. LAB. CODE §1531.
F. Supp. 1206.
supra note 70 and accompanying text.
supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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B.

Internal Regulation

Faced with a lack of effective state regulation, players' associations
in different professional sports have attempted to regulate sports agents
internally.'22 A recent attempt is the National Football League Players'
Associations Regulations Governing Contracts Advisors (hereinafter
NFLPA Regulations) which became effective in September 1983.123
The NFLPA Regulations were developed in response to the growing
concern among National Football League (NFL) players about the
quality of representation offered in the past by lawyers, agents, and
others in individual contract negotiations with NFL clubs.' 24 The
regulations govern any agent, attorney or nonattorney, when
negotiating contracts and when giving advice to individual players in
the context of negotiating with NFL teams.' 25 An agent is investigated
and a license is denied if the agent has been involved in prior conduct constituting fraud, misrepresentation, embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, or theft. 126 Before the agent can represent the
athlete, the athlete must request the agent to act as his representative
and must verify this request to the NFL Players Association.' 27
The Contract Advisor Regulations are unique because they establish
not only a fee schedule,' zs but also a maximum fee percentage that
can be charged by the agent.' 29 The regulations also allow this percentage limitation to increase slightly if the athlete receives a contract
guaranteeing employment, commonly referred to as a "no-cut"
contract. 3 ' The same section defines the athlete's compensation, from
which the agent's salary is computed, to include salary and signing
or reporting bonus payments. Incentive bonuses are excluded, however,

122.

For a discussion of the role of the players' associations in basketball, hockey, and

baseball, see RuXIN, supra note 10, at 93-98.
123. National Football League Players' Association Regulations Governing Contract Advisors §8 [hereinafter cited as NFLPA Regulations].
124. Letter from Kendra D. Chatman, Agent Certification Coordinator NFLPA (November

16, 1983).
125. NFLPA Regulations, supra note 123, §1.
126. Id. §2(C).
127. Id. §3. This same section provides: "The contract advisor shall be soley responsible
and liable for, and shall hold the NFLPA harmless from, any damages or claims arising from

his or her activities as contract advisors." Id.
128.
129.
130.

Id. §4(C) (1)-(5).
Id. §4(C)(4).
Id. The term "no-cut" is often used interchangeably with the term "guaranteed".

A true "no-cut" contract guarantees the player a spot on the teams roster, while a "guaranteed"
contract ensures that the player will be paid even if he does not make the roster. RuxiN, supra
note 10, at 102-03.
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because they are considered nonguaranteed payments.'" An incentive
bonus has been described as an amount of money that is paid to
the athlete for meeting certain criteria, such as playing in a certain
number of games or making an all-star team.' 32 By not including incentive payments as compensation, the regulations present a potential conflict of interest problem.
Although an incentive payment may be in the athlete's best interest,
an agent is unlikely to have the athlete paid in this manner because
the agent will receive a smaller fee.' 33 Under the NFL Regulations,
an agent may base his fee only upon guaranteed payments. If payment is based upon a contract calling for contingent payments, the
agent is running the risk that his fee will be lower than if the contract called for guaranteed payments. Supporters of the NFL Regulations urge that the burden is upon the athlete to accomplish the event
that calls for contingent payments to be made, thus the agent should
receive no percentage of the payments.' 3 The agent, however, is the
person who negotiated the contract for the athlete. The agent used
his skills and expertise to structure the contract in a way that would
benefit the athlete. Any conflict of interest, therefore, should be
resolved in the agent's favor.' 3 The agent should receive some compensation based on incentive income paid to the athlete, even if that
income is lower than the percentage of guaranteed compensation
received.
Section 4(c)(5) of the NFL Regulations provides that an agent may
not receive his fee unless and until the player receives the compensation upon which the fee is based.' 36 This same section also prevents
collection of a fee based on deferred compensation unless the compensation is received by the player.' 37 This provision is directed toward
remedying the situation in which an athlete receives a multiple year
contract and the agent takes his fee based on a percentage of the
131. NFLPA Regulations, supra note 123, §4(C)(5). "[T]he term compensation shall be deemed to include only salary, signing bonus, or reporting bonus payments . . . [but] shall not

include any incentive or performance bonuses." Id.
132.
133.

RUxIN, supra note 10, at 101.
This is true because of the exclusion of incentive bonuses from the athlete's compensa-

tion which the agent bases his fee upon. If, according to §4(C)(5), half the athletes compensation received is in the form of incentive payments, the agent can base his fee only upon the
other half of the payments. NFLPA Regulations, supra note 123, §4(C).
134. See Johnson and Lang, supra note 81, at 406 n.174.
135. Id. at 403 n.164.
136. NFLPA Regulations, supra note 123, §4(C)(5). "Such fee shall not be payable, however,
until and unless the player has been on the clubs active list under such contract for at least
one regular season game." Id.
137. Id. "[A] contract advisor [is prohibited] from receiving any fee for his services until
and unless the player receives the compensation upon which the fee is based." Id.
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entire contract, regardless of whether the athlete remains with the team
or whether the team pays the athlete.' 3 Under the regulations, the
agent can only take his percentage based on the amount the athlete
actually receives, not the amount he is expected to receive.' 39 The
regulations also address a problem not covered by current California
law, namely, solicitation of clients.
SOLICITATION

The National Football League Regulations prohibit the NFL contract advisor from engaging in the solicitation of clients.' 40 Since attorneys are already barred by the Code of Professional Responsibility from participating in this type of activity,' 4 the regulations attempt to place attorneys on equal footing with nonattorneys. The same
provision is devised to prohibit nonattorney agents from engaging in
unscrupulous activities to obtain new clients.' 42 The regulations also
are designed to protect the athlete agent from other agents who value
obtaining a new client 4 3more than a preexisting contract between an
athlete and an agent.'
44
As previously mentioned in the discussion of the Roundball case,'
an athlete frequently will hire more than one agent, attempting to
obtain the best contract available. To accord some order to these situations, the Contract Advisor Regulations provide that upon agreement,
the agent becomes the "exclusive representative" for negotiating the
player's contract.' 45 This reduces the likelihood that an athlete will
hire more than one agent to conduct his contract negotiations. Often,
agents will attempt to represent athletes even though the athlete is
under a previous agreement with a different agent. This measure
recognizes the need to protect the agent, who is in a preexisting
representation agreement with the athlete, from other agressive agents.
This same provision dictates that no amendment can be made to the
agreement without the approval of the NFL Players Association.

138. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
140. NFLPA Regulations, supra note 123, §5(C)(1)-(5).
141. MODEL CODE OF PRoFEssSIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY. DR 2-103(A)(1983).
142. See Johnson and Reid, Some Offers They Couldn't Refuse, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May
21, 1979, at 28 (for an interesting discussion of ethically questionable activities being conducted
in the recruitment of college athletes by agents); see also Axthelm, Marvin Barnes and the
Work Ethic, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1974, at 61. An examination of the problems occurring in
the recruitment of amatuer athletes is beyond the scope of this comment.
143. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
,45. NFLPA Regulations, supra note 123, §4(A).
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Moreover, an agreement must be in writing, otherwise it is void. 14
With the exception of the problems discussed, the NFL Players'
Association Regulations are a marked improvement over any other
method of regulation. Although the NFL Regulations do not include
a bonding requirement, the addition of this type of provision, if
tailored to the modern wage scale of professional athletes, would increase the effectiveness of the NFL Regulations. The NFL Regulations also provide a source of information to which the athlete can
look to make a sound decision when selecting an agent. Under the
NFL Regulations, an athlete is able to contact the Players Association to determine whether a certain agent is worthy of being hired. 47
Alternatively, an agent may contact the Players Association to determine whether an athlete has an existing valid representation agreement
with another agent. 48 Although arguably the Regulations, designed
by the Players' Association, work to the decisive advantage of the
athlete, they are an equitable method of regulating the representation
business. Because of the experience of the Players' Association in dealing with the types of problems experienced by athletes and agents,
the Players' Association was in a position to draft regulations designed
directly to remedy the problem areas for both. Another method of
internal regulation is that created by the agents themselves.
C. The Association of Representatives of Professional Athletes
The National Football League Regulations are internal regulations
that were developed by a particular sports association over agents
representing athletes in that sport.' 4 9 The Association of Representatives of Professional Athletes (ARPA) is a method of self-regulation
by agents.'

0

ARPA is a national association of sports agents, with

a voluntary membership consisting of agents who are both entrepreneurs in the representation field and experienced attorneys."
The association is comprised of approximately 200 agents throughout
the United States, representing more than 1500 professional athletes
in many different sports.' 2 With the assistance of the NFL Players'
146.

Id.

147.

One author comments: "To aid him in the selection of a good [agent], the player

might call the players' associations of the respective leagues who keep files for this purpose,
as well as other athletes, his college coach, or people he respects." GALLNER, supra note 1, at 65.
148. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.

149. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
150. RuxiN, supra note 10, at 89-90.
151. Association of Representatives of Professional Athletes, Code of Ethics (1983) [hereinafter
cited as ARPA Ethics].
152. Id.
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Association, ARPA was created in 1978 for the dual purpose of "providing a strong voice for its members as well as a safeguard for the
athlete."' 3 ARPA attempts to achieve its goals by offering educational seminars and by improving the ethical standards of the
profession.' 5
The ARPA Code of Ethics resembles that of the American Bar
Association. The ARPA regulations contain five canons covering (1)
the degree of integrity and competence required in athlete representation, (2) dignified conduct, (3) management responsibility, (4) client
confidence, and (5) competent handling of client matters.' As a whole,
the ARPA Code of Ethics is a proficient attempt at self-regulation
by agents. 56 The code of ethics takes an affirmative stance on solicitation by declaring that ethical conduct precludes an athlete representative from soliciting a client, or from receiving compensation directly
from a professional athletic team for having an athlete sign with that
team. 157 Many of the provisions, however, are too broad and do not
establish definitive rules from which an agent can determine his course
of conduct. For example, no fee schedule is established with which
the agent must conform; only certain factors are provided for deter58
mining whether a fee is reasonable.
The main problem with the internal regulations of ARPA is that compliance is voluntary. No sanctions can be taken against one who is
not a member, and no agent can be compelled to become a member.
ARPA lacks the power of the NFLPA to compel persons wishing
to represent athletes to comply with its regulations. 5 9 In addition,
ARPA lacks the authority of a legislative mandate similar to California Labor Code section 1500. ARPA was created with the aid of the
NFLPA.1 6 1 With the introduction of the NFLPA Regulations, however,
much of the support that ARPA once enjoyed no longer may exist.
Due to the lack of success the ARPA Code of Ethics has achieved,
the NFLPA now has placed its authority behind its own system of
regulation. It is questionable, therefore, whether ARPA can look to

153. Id.
154. RuxiN, supra note 10, at 101.
155. ARPA Ethics, supra note 151, at 1-6.
156. RuxiN, supra note 10, at 90. One writer noted that "ARPA is trying to promote standards of competence, professionalism, and integrity . . . " Id.
157. ARPA Ethics, supra note 151, Rule 2-104(G).
158. Id. Rule 2-104(D)(1)-(5).
159. A writer for the Washington Post commented that "since membership is entirely voluntary, ARPA lacks clout, and no one in the business is forced to subscribe to its code of ethics
unless he or she chooses." RuxiN, supra note 10, at 90.
160. Id. at 89.
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the NFLPA for active support because the NFLPA must now use
its resources to implement the NFLPA Regulations. The NFL Regulations do not take any formal stance on the ARPA rules. The material
provisions of both methods of regulation cover different areas of sports
agency and are not in conflict with each other. Nevertheless, the current ARPA regulations are not comprehensive. ARPA also lacks the
authority to provide an effective system of agent regulations due to
the fact that membership in ARPA is voluntary.' 6' The American Bar
Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility, however, provides guidelines for the conduct of attorney agents. The Model Code
of Professional Responsibility may assist in the regulation of some
athlete agents.
D. ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility (hereinafter ABA Code) plays a role in the way attorney agents
must conduct their activities. Two provisions are particularly important: DR 2-103(A) provides that a lawyer shall not recommend himself
or his organization to a client,' 62 and DR 2-103(B) prevents a lawyer
from giving anything of value to any person to secure his
employment.' 63 These two rules have the effect of prohibiting the
solicitation of athletes as legal clients. 6' Attorneys operating as agents,
however, have found ways to circumvent these provisions."' This occurs most commonly when the attorney works for a sports management firm. Certain members of the firm who are not attorneys solicit
the clientele and the attorney agent then does the actual negotiation
work.' 66
The American Bar Association does not have the power to control
the sports agency field because not all agents are attorneys, and the
ABA Code does not apply to nonattorneys. To simplify enforcement
and promote equity, effective regulations must apply to attorney and

161.
162.

See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBLITY

DR 2-103(A) (1983). "A lawyer shall

not . . . recommend employment as a practitioner, or himself, his partner or associate to a
lay person who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." Id.
163.

Id. DR 2-103(B) (1983). "A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value

to a person or organization to recommend or secure his employment by a client, or as a reward
for having made a recommendation resulting in his employment by a client . . . " Id.
164.

See, GALLNER, supra note 1, at 69.

165.

See id. at 65.

166.

Id.
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nonattorney agents on an equal basis. Compliance cannot
be a deci167
sion left up to the agent, but must be mandatory.
A need for parity is evidenced by both the NFLPA Regulations
and ARPA Code of Ethics.' 68 Clearly, those involved in the sports
representation field would desire to increase the standards placed on
nonattorneys rather than risk a reduction in the level of professional
responsibility among attorneys. With these ideas in mind, an examination of possible solutions to the problems involved in the regulation
of sports agents demonstrates that these goals are attainable.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

An examination of the current methods of regulation in the athlete
agent field has revealed that no one method is effective entirely. A
study of the ways to remedy the problem, therefore, is necessary.
The examination that follows is designed to explain the possible
solutions and to analyze whether a selective synthesis of current
methods is in order.
In the new chapter of the Labor Code that governs professional
sports agents, California has the potential for a legitimate and effective method of agent regulation.'6 9 Internal regulation, however, such
as the NFLPA Regulations, may be the most effective means of regulation because each set of regulations can be contoured to the sport
in which the athlete participates.' 7 Finally, methods of regulation in
industries similar to the sports industry may be adopted and tailored
to fit the needs of the athlete agent business.''
A.

California Labor Code

The California Legislature has taken a step in the proper direction
by enacting legislation directed toward regulating the athlete agent
field. The fact that the Legislature enacted the new chapter of the
Labor Code dealing with athlete agents evidences the existence of problems in the representation field. The chapter regulating agents U it
presently reads, however, is unenforceable and fails to regulate the
167. For a comment on the problems of regulations imposing voluntary compliance, ssupra note 159.
168. See, e.g., NFLPA Regulations, supra note 123, §5(C); ARPA Ethics, supra note 151,
Rule 2-103.
169. See supra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
171. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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representation field adequately. The chapter of the California Labor
Code presently governing professional sports agents can be improved
by making certain substantive changes aimed at providing protection
for both the athlete and the sports agent.
1. Improving Existing Law
The current Labor Code provisions regulating athlete agents are
insufficient.' They are ambiguous in defining the persons covered
by the laws,"' contain an unproductive bonding requirement,' 74 and
lack enforcement capabilities."' Because the lack of enforcement can
be rectified when the class of persons who fall within the law is defined
more precisely, the need for a clearer definition of athlete agent is
apparent.' 7 Specifically, the provision excluding an attorney "when
acting as legal counsel" from the provisions should be omitted, and
instead, the law should identify when an attorney will be exempt from
the registration requirements. The exemption could be based on either
a percentage of the attorneys work that involves sports agency, or
that percentage of his gross income that is derived from representing
professional athletes. In addition to this change, the code section pertaining to bonding requirements must be amended.
2. Proposalfor Bonding Requirement
Section 1519 of the Labor Code currently requires an agent to post
a bond in the amount of $10,000 prior to being issued a license by
the Labor Commissioner.' 77 Some critics have called for a dramatic
increase in the amount of this bond because of the high average salaries
paid to professional athletes.'" A substantial increase in the amount
of the bond requirement, however, without regard to the value of
the contract being negotiated, may price a lot of agents out of the
business. When an athlete and an agent enter into a representation
agreement to negotiate contracts or to obtain employment for the
athlete, an escrow fund could be created in the name of the agent.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See supra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
177. CAL. LAB. CODE §1519.
178. California Senate Select Committee on Licensed and Designated Sports proposed amendments to AB 440, at 5 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Amendments] (copy on file at the Pacific
Law Journal). The committee has suggested an increase in the amount of the bond from $10,000
to $50,000. Id.
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The agent's percentage of the full value of the contract would be
placed into this escrow and released only as the athlete receives his
compensation from the team as dictated by the contract. 79 This would
ensure that the agent would receive a percentage based on the amount
the athlete actually received, not the amount he was supposed to
receive. 8 ' In addition, this method would guarantee the agent only
that compensation to which he is entitled. Furthermore, the possibility
of fraudulent conduct would be reduced since the agent could not
take his percentage and depart without completing his obligations under
the representation agreement.' 8 '
The escrow fund method could be designed to give an exclusion
to the attorney agent. An attorney in the State of California is not
required to carry malpractice insurance.18 2 The exemption, however,
could accept proof of a sufficient amount of malpractice insurance
if the applicant for an athlete agent license is a member in good standing of the State Bar of California.' 8 3 By purchasing malpractice insurance, the attorney agent in effect has become bonded. Because
the attorney's malpractice insurance could provide any injured athlete
with a guaranteed source of relief, no further bonding requirement
would be necessary. A final way of improving Labor Code section
1519 would be to implement a "floating" bond requirement.
3.

Floating Bond Requirement

As explained earlier, the California bonding requirement is disproportionate to the current salary levels in professional sports, and thus
provides an inadequate remedy for the athlete.' 84 When an agent
negotiates a new contract to replace a previous contract, the Labor
Commissioner could require that the agent post a bond at a percentage rate of the value of the athlete's present professional contract.
The amount of the bond, therefore, would have a direct correlation
179. The escrow method would be one way to implement NFLPA Regulation §4(C)(5) which
prevents an agent from receiving his fee until the player receives the compensation upon which
the fee is based. NFLPA Regulations, supra note 123, §4(C)(5).
180. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
181. This would prevent the type of situation discussed by Gallner:
If the agent is employed at 10 percent of the negotiated contract value, and he
negotiates a $50,000 with a $5,000 bonus (payable immediately) for his athlete-client,
the agent would have earned $5,500 regardless of whether or not the athlete makes
the squad. That money will come out of the bonus, and the athlete will end up
with nothing [if he does not make the team].
GALLNR, supra note 1, at 67.
182. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6060.
183. Amendments, supra note 178, at 5.
184. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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to the value of the athlete's services and would be a more fair representation of the amount of the agent's misfeasance than the present flat
amount of $10,000. This method would give greater protection to the
athlete who is negotiating a large salary contract. Furthermore, this
scheme would not be restrictive to those agents negotiating smaller
contracts for which the bond suggested by some critics could be larger
than the contracts themselves."' An alternative to legislatively mandated regulation is internal regulation of the athlete agent.
B.

Internal Regulation

If the California Legislature chooses not to devise an effective
method of regulating the athlete agent, professional players' associations may adopt methods to regulate agents in their particular sport.
The benefit of internal regulation is that it can be well tailored to
the problems unique to the particular sport.1 6 Enforcement would
be improved since the burden of implementing these regulations would
be upon the players association rather than upon some branch of state
government that would be responsible for many different sports.
The best of these methods of internal regulation is the National
Football League Players Association Regulations.' 7 As previously
discussed, the NFLPA Regulations have eliminated the attorney/nonattorney classification' 8 and have made the solicitation of clients by
agents unethical. 8 9 The provisions prohibiting solicitation appear to
be a step in the right direction to curb the abuses that occur when
agents attempt to obtain new clients.' Prohibiting solicitation would
prevent athletes from being inundated with offers of representation
that create the risk that misrepresentations will be made by the agent.' 9'
The difficulty in applying the NFLPA Regulations in California
is that they conflict with certain provisions of the California Labor
Code. For example, the NFLPA Regulations prevent nonattorney
agents from engaging in solicitation,' 9 while the pertinent provisions
of the California Labor Code do not. A nonattorney agent in California can be in strict compliance with the new chapter of the Labor
185. Under the proposed amendments of the California Senate Select Committee, an agent
possibly could have to deposit a $50,000 bond in order to negotiate a $25,000 contract. See
Amendments, supra note 178, at 5.
186. See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text.

187.

Id.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Regulations, supra note 123, §1.
Id. §5(C)(1-5).
GALLNER, supra note 1, at 53.
For an example of such a situation, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
Regulations, supra note 123, §5(C)(1)-(5).
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Code while in violation of one of the NFLPA Regulations. The result
is that an agent in California who wishes to represent a professional
football player in negotiations with an NFL team must follow the
more exacting standards of the NFLPA Regulations.
California should either adopt regulations similar to those of the
NFL Players' Association, or combine the effective provisions of the
present Labor Code with the NFLPA Regulations. This type of selective incorporation would accomplish, for example, the prohibition of
agent solicitation of clients'93 while eliminating any ambiguity in defining who is covered by the regulations.' 9 The NFLPA Regulations,
if incorporated into the Labor Code, then would apply to agents in
all professional sports in California. Industries other than the professional sports industry are regulated to some degree by external agencies. Successful regulatory methods in those industries may provide
the California Legislature with alternative approaches in formulating
an enforceable scheme for regulating the professional sports agent.
C. Adopting Regulations from Similar Industries

The field of athlete representation is not the only area in which
a need exists for regulation of the agent. One commentator advocates
a system of regulation similar to that used to regulate stock brokers.' 95
Stock investors and athletes are in analogous situations when they
agree to have another person represent them. Both situations involve
a principal-agent relationship in which the agent must act in the best
interest of his principal within the authority given to him by the agreement between principal and agent.1 96 In both situations, the principal
is bound by the actions of his agent, provided the agent acted within
the scope of his authority. 97 More importantly, in both situations,
absent proper regulations and provisions for excluding those persons
incapable of acting in a fiduciary capacity, the client is at a serious
disadvantage and the possibility for fraud and misconduct is great.
The Federal Securities Act'98 establishes not only a bonding requirement for brokers,' 99 but requires brokers to file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission a past business history report and a yearly

193.
194.
195.
196.

197.
198.
!99.

Id.
Id. §1; see also supra note 188 and accompanying text.
Note, supra note 13, at 569-70.
W. SEAvEY, HANDBOOK OF ThE LAW OF AGENCY, §3 (1964).
Id.
15 U.S.C. §78 (1976).

Id.
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balance sheet and income statement. 20 Stock brokers also are required
to pass an entrance examination prior to being issued a brokers
license.2"' Provisions similar to the Securities Act are potentially applicable to a scheme of comprehensive regulation of athlete agents.
The expense of implementing the Act, however, makes it a less
preferable method of regulation. For instance, the cost of conducting
entrance examinations of potential agents may not be justified by the
extent of agent malpractice. The filing of a yearly balance sheet,
however, would provide the regulatory agency an excellent opportunity
to scrutinize the operations of the agent without incurring excessive
costs.2"2 The most effective provisions of the Federal Securities Act
could be adopted into a comprehensive regulatory scheme for athlete
agents. In the following section, the author will propose a final solution to the regulation issue. This solution involves a synthesis of the
most effective provisions from all the existing and proposed methods
of regulation.
THE PROPER BLEND FOR THE SOLUTION

The best solution to the regulation problem comes not from one
set of laws or proposals, but from a proper blend of the most effective provisions of several types of regulations. First, attorneys should
not be excluded from any regulation system, similar to the exclusion
found in California Labor Code section 1500.203 By expressly including
attorneys within the purview of its regulations, the NFLPA has
eliminated any difficulty in determining whom those regulations cover.
Regulations that govern both attorneys and nonattorneys on an equal
basis would provide uniformity regarding the solicitation of clients
by athlete agents. 204 Currently, attorney agents are prohibited from
soliciting clients by the ABA Code. 0 ' Any new method of regulation, rather than allowing attorney agents the right to solicit, which
would be in direct conflict with the ABA Code, should prevent both
types of agents from soliciting clients. As provided in the NFLPA
Regulations, the athlete should be advised to request the services of
the agent. In addition, the athlete should have to certify to the Labor

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Examination of the cost effectiveness of implementation of the Federal Securities Act
to regulate athlete agents is beyond the scope of this comment.
203. CAL. LAB. CODE §1500(b).
204. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.

1256

1984 / ProfessionalSports Agent

Commissioner that he has requested the agent to represent him. 20 6
This type of provision will protect athletes from the overpowering
influence used by agents to attract clients.
Third, the regulations should not impose a flat-fee bond requirement for the reasons that the bond requirement either fails to take
into consideration the value of the contracts being negotiated, or is
so large as to be prohibitive.2" 7 A floating bond provision2" 8 or an
escrow payment system20 9 for compensating agents should be adopted.
Under either method, proof of a sufficient amount of malpractice
insurance could allow the attorney to receive an exemption from the
bonding requirements. 2" The attorney's malpractice insurance would
provide the athlete with a source of damages if he were injured as
a result of the attorney's misfeasance.
Fourth, the author proposes that any new form of regulation must
contain a fee schedule which takes into consideration the market value
of the professional athletes' talent and the type of contract negotiated
by the agent.2 ' This type of fee schedule will not only reward compensation based on the work performed by the agent at each stage
of the contract, but also will ensure that the agent receives no more
than what he actually deserves pursuant to the representation
agreement.21 2 Any fee schedule must specify a maximum percentage
of the value of the contract that the agent may take as his
compensation.21 3 A sliding fee schedule properly allocates more compensation to the agent following the consumation of the contract when
the agent is doing most of his work, than in the later years when
the athlete is doing the work and has established himself with the
employer.21 4
Finally, to prevent the athlete from encountering legal problems
by hiring more than one agent, and to preclude agents from attempting to represent an athlete once the athlete has an agreement with
another representative, an exclusive representation provision should
be included.2"' This would provide the first agent who validly con-

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Regulations, supra note 123, §3.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
See Amendments, supra note 178, at 5.
See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.

212.

This will remedy the type of problem that occurred in Brown v. Woolf, 554 F. Supp.

1206 (1983). See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Regulations, supra note 123, §4(C)(1-5).
214. Id.
215. Id. §4(A).

1257

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 15
tracts with the athlete the assurance that only he will be seeking
employment opportunities for his client. Under the exclusive representation provision agents should be prevented from attempting to persuade athletes to leave other agents by using false inducements as
in the Roundball case.
This author has proposed that the solution to regulating professional sports agents is a synthesis of the most effective provisions
of several types of regulation. Almost three years have passed since
the new chapter was added to the Labor Code governing sports
agents.2 '1 6 At that time, the California Legislature attempted to create
a system of regulating the athlete representation field. The problems
that existed prior to the enactment of these laws, however, still exist;
.therefore, the burden once again is upon the Legislature to continue
its efforts to implement an effective system of regulation.
CONCLUSION

Substantial agreement exists that agents serve a useful purpose." 7
A good agent among other things, can shape the package of compensation an athlete receives to meet the player's needs, enable the
athlete to earn extra income from endorsements, speeches, and commercials, and advise an athlete about the effect his personal conduct
may have on his career. A dramatic increase in the amounts of money
paid for the services of professional athletes has caused an increase
in unethical conduct by athlete agents. This increase also has prompted
frequent legal disputes. Many professional athletes find their on-thefield accomplishments being overshadowed by their off-the-field legal
difficulties. At no time has the need to regulate athlete agents been
greater than at the present. Any form of regulation must control and
deter unethical conduct by agents. In addition, the regulations must
-allow the athlete to make the best business decision available when
entering into a contract with a professional team.
The present method of regulation adopted by California suffers not
cmly from ambiguities in defining who is covered by the laws, but
also from a bonding requirement that completely fails to consider
the current salary market of the professional athlete. For example,
the, minimum salary that a professional basketball player can receive
is $40,000.2 8 Based on Labor Code Section 1519,219 a $10,000 surety
216.
217.
218.
219.

1258

CAL. LAB. CODE §§1500-1547 (effective January 1, 1982).
NER, supra note 1, at 50.
RuxjN, supra note 10, at 112.
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bond obviously cannot provide the athlete with a remedy if he is injured due to the agent's unscrupulous conduct. Other methods of
regulation, however, present California with alternate approaches that
could protect the athlete from the types of problems previously
discussed.
The author has examined several alternatives to the present method
of regulation based on the types of problems found to exist in some
of the recent cases in the field of athlete agency. The solution to
the current problems lies with a combination of the most effective
provisions of several different forms of regulation. Attorneys and
nonattorneys should be covered by any system of regulation. The
system should include both a floating bond requirement and a fee
schedule that recognizes the value of the agent to the athlete. Finally,
attorney and nonattorney athlete agents should be prohibited from
soliciting clients. As proposed in this comment the proper synthesis
will provide the athlete with the means to receive the best representation possible with the least amount of agent-induced problems. The
burden is now upon the California Legislature to remedy the current
difficulties. The Legislature must examine why the current laws have
been unsuccessful, and, based upon alternatives found elsewhere, it
must restructure the provisions of the Labor Code regulating professional sports agents to provide an equitable scheme of regulation for
both the athlete and the agent.
Dana Alden Fox
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